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 Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form 
of the moral hazard problem.  Global firms use economic and political power to 
manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity 
to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity.  Unless other 
actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, 
globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at 
the global level.  This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level 
by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, 
creating a crisis of legitimacy and, ultimately, security for the international economic 
system.  Enlightened self-interest dictates that home countries and their citizens address 
this dualism underlying contemporary globalization.   
 
I. Definition of Globalization 
 
 One of the most common definitions of globalization is the elimination of time 
and space as a factor in human social relations.  Due to revolutions in computing and 
telecommunications, it is now the case that information and ideas (and even money) can 
move with unprecedented speed around the world, creating the possibility of virtually 
instantaneous real time global exchanges.  Understanding the implications of this shift is 
one of the chief tasks of the liberal arts and social sciences today.   
 
 Transposing that to our present context, we might say that globalization involves 
the elimination of time and space as factors in international economic relations, 
specifically in international business transactions.  Now, at first glance, this would seem 
fanciful, if not mistaken.  Who better than global entrepreneurs knows that time and 
space are still factors in the global production, transportation and sale of goods, services, 
capital, labor, and even knowledge.  Certainly, the travel weary global executive is very 
much aware of the immediate personal effects of time and space.  However, I would 
assert that the definition is still relevant, and suggestive, for international business 
transactions in two ways, one affecting markets and one affecting regulation.   
 
 When one looks at economic globalization one can distinguish two core aspects: 
“market globalization” and “regulatory globalization.” Market globalization focuses on 
the increased volume of transactions in which goods, services, labor and capital cross 
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national boundaries, facilitated both by technological change and decreasing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, such that these transactions taken as a whole begin to resemble those 
of a single market spanning the globe.  This characterization of globalization begins with 
the fact that there has always been transboundary economic activity, and argues that such 
activity is increasing both in scope and scale such as to warrant a new name: 
"globalization." Thus market globalization asserts in essence that globalization is a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative change.   
 
   This common approach to defining economic globalization, however, represents 
only one aspect of economic globalization.  Another definition, which shall be termed 
"regulatory globalization," includes the quantitative changes highlighted in market 
globalization, but emphasizes a qualitative change in the nature of our regulation of 
markets.  In particular, regulatory globalization focuses on the complex social processes 
which have led to the regulation of markets for goods, labor, capital and services at new 
levels, levels which require formalized interstate cooperation through new and powerful 
institutions like the WTO, and which may, in certain cases, transcend nation-state control 
to a significant degree, as in the case of the European Union.  
 
 
II Regulatory Globalization and the Moral Hazard Problem 
 
 It is this aspect of globalization, regulatory globalization, and its effects on 
international business transactions, which I would like to focus on in these brief 
observations.  The move to a global market has highlighted shortcomings in the 
Westphalian system of national regulation, as well as deficiencies in the current level of 
multilateral or global regulation.   
 
 The central social problem posed by market-led globalization is that of 
externalities.  Historically, regulation is the chief restraint on firms’ tendencies to 
externalize costs.  However, when markets outstrip regulation, as they are doing in 
current forms of globalization, we create the conditions for increased externalization by 
multinational firms of the social costs of economic activity, increasing the demand for 
effective regulation at the global level.  For example, we need multilateral regulation of 
foreign investment to address problem host states face in seeking to regulate the social 
costs of foreign investment, such as the regulation of labor and employment conditions 
 
 However, this is precisely what host states by themselves cannot do.  States face a 
collective action problem as long as they are forced to attempt individually to regulate the 
conditions for multinational economic activity.  Thus territorially-based jurisdiction is 
inadequate to address many of the challenges of economic globalization.  However, 
global regulation today is underdeveloped.  Existing multilateral regulatory bodies such 
as the WTO and the IMF have to a significant degree been captured by precisely those 
states which also are the home states of the powerful multinational enterprises.  When 
regulation is directly or indirectly in the hands of a few powerful home states, there is the 
risk of self serving regulation.   
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 This is the moral hazard of global regulation today: powerful multinational 
enterprises are essentially regulating themselves, through the interventions of the states 
which they influence in the multilateral regulatory bodies which such states have 
captured.  In private law, we generally think of moral hazard as a perverse effect of 
certain contracts, such as insurance contracts, which can incentivize insured parties to 
engage in risky behavior they otherwise might not engage in but for the insurance itself.  
In the global economic regulatory context, I am suggesting the same dynamic is at work: 
powerful global firms use their leverage over home state regulation, and over the 
multilateral institutions which their home states dominate, to create rules which eliminate 
the legal risks to their activities.  Since host jurisdictions already face almost 
insurmountable collective action challenges to effective regulation of foreign firms, this 
means that powerful global firms are essentially regulating themselves.   
 
 This creates a problem of legitimacy, in addition to the problems which 
externalities themselves create (pollution, social welfare costs, etc) for those who suffer 
them.  This legitimacy problem has two aspects.  First, as long as regulation is controlled 
by powerful home states and their firms, and the rest of the world consists of host 
jurisdictions without the power to effectively regulate by themselves, economic 
globalization means that most of the world will be subject to forms of economic activity 
which they have not in any meaningful way consented to.  Under the liberal principles of 
justice which powerful home countries claim allegiance to, this is a serious compromise 
to the legitimacy of the resulting global regulatory system.   
 
 Second, the global market is currently being regulated by the market actors 
themselves.  Globalization thus re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber 
baron” capitalism at the global level.  This model of economic activity has been rejected 
at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently 
dominate globalization.  This is a further challenge to legitimacy: there is no effective 
rule of law when the powerful make their own rules.  Moreover, it is a form of hypocrisy 
unfortunately common in international relations: we export what we reject at home.   
 
 Enlightened self-interest dictates that home countries and their citizens address 
this dualism underlying contemporary globalization.  The nature of globalization not only 
intensifies problems of externalities and the challenge of legitimate, effective regulation, 
but also the public perception of externalities, the firms which create them, and the host 
countries which facilitate this.  Put short, information globalization means there are fewer 
and fewer places to hide externalities from your shareholders, your customers, and the 
citizen/consumers of your home jurisdiction. 
 
 The changes in telecommunications and information flow which propel 
globalization, have also influenced our understanding of the economic effects of 
globalization on those far from the power centers.  In the same way that television during 
the Viet Nam war permanently altered the domestic US politics of war, information 
globalization is permanently changing the politics of global business.  Problems of 
development, inequality and justice are not “safely” behind transportation and 
communication barriers – they are immediately present in the news and on the Internet.  
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This means that, contrary to past practice, firms and countries cannot as easily externalize 
social costs with impunity.   However, therein lies an opportunity; as traditional folk 
wisdom says, “the medicine is in the poison.” 
 
III Strategies 
 
 In order to address this moral hazard problem, we must bypass the institutions 
which themselves are embroiled in it, and alter the economics and politics of regulation at 
the national and global levels.  One set of strategies is itself market-based.  Attempts to 
mobilize consumers in powerful home jurisdictions to incorporate social concerns into 
their consumption decision, can affect the market incentives for multinational 
corporations to alter their externalization policies.   
 
 Another set of strategies involves domestic politics in both home and host 
jurisdictions.  Like-minded citizens can organize networks between consumer-citizens in 
both home and host jurisdictions, bypassing territorial political boundaries to create 
global constituencies.  These constituencies can coordinate efforts to influence domestic 
regulation in both home and host jurisdictions, and alter the incentives for states to act at 
the global regulatory level as well.  Multinational corporations should not be able to 
profit from information asymmetries and territorial jurisdictional boundaries; instead, 
networks of citizen-consumers can themselves use globalizing information flows to 
counter the information advantages of multinational corporations and eliminate the veils 
of secrecy which shield overseas externalities from affluent citizen consumers in home 
jurisdictions. 
 
 Such networks can also support coalitions among host jurisdictions which can 
effectively demand global regulation addressing the social costs of global capitalism.  
This approach can minimize collective action problems so host jurisdictions can become 
rule makers and not just rule takers.  
 
IV Conclusion 
 
 Externality-driven globalization clearly threatens the social well-being of the 
many people trapped in host jurisdictions.  The current international climate demonstrates  
how economic exploitation and failures of legitimacy threaten the stability and security of 
the entire global system - home and host jurisdictions alike.  Information globalization 
makes it clearer to home country citizens how this current model of globalization 
threatens their security and well-being as well: their profits as mutual fund shareholders, 
their prosperity as workers, their affluence as consumers.  To the extent that citizens of 
home jurisdictions mobilize, they are, in the end, only helping themselves. 
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